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Foreign Water in Colorado-The City's Right
to Recapture and Re-Use Its Transmountain
Diversion
INTRODUCTION

The celebrated growth in population of the western states following World War II scarcely requires elaboration.! It is reflected
in Colorado particularly in the strip of cities and counties of the
eastern slope running from Boulder in the north to Pueblo in the
south,2 and continues apace through the 1960s.3
This expansion has increased to the point of severity the
demands upon a water supply which has been historically meager4
and which had already prompted cities to finance transmountain diversions from the state's western slope watershed to meet present and
anticipated requirements.5 Impressive as they are in quantity, these
1In

the decade 1950-60, by United States census, the population of Arizona increased
by 73.7% to 1,302,161; California by 48.5% to 15,717,204; Colorado by 32.4% to
1,753,947; New Mexico by 39.6% to 951,023. COLORADO YEAR BOOK 1959-1961,
at 280 (1962).
2 In the decade 1950-60, Boulder County grew by 53.7% to a popoulation of 74,254;
Denver by 18.8% to 493,887 (and to a metropolitan population of 929,383, twentysixth in size in the nation); El Paso County (Colorado Springs, Fort Carson, Air
Force Academy) by 92.9% to 143,742; Pueblo County by 31.6% to 118,707. Id. at
282, 284.
3E.g., Colorado Springs' Size Doubles in Four Years.
Colorado Springs-This city, seventh-fastest growing metropolis of its size
in the United States, has doubled its size [acreage] in the past four years
... officials reported ....
The city . . . during 1964 [brought its size by
annexation) to 21,506 acres. This compares with . . . 10,874 acres in Jan.
1, 1961 . . . . Latest estimates by city planners peg the Colorado Springs

population at 90,000, which is 20,000 more than the 1960 census figure of
70,194 . . . . The Denver Post, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 27, col. 1 '(final ed.).
4 The Colorado mean annual precipitation is 17 inches, but is considerably less at many
lower elevations on both eastern and western slopes: In the Denver, Greely, and
Ft. Morgan area, 10-15 inches; Colorado Springs, Pueblo, and Canon City, 10-15
inches; Lamar, La Junta, and Arkansas Valley, 10-15 inches; San Luis Valley, less
than 10 inches; but in Ft. Collins, Lyons, Boulder, and Golden, 15-20 inches; and
Akron, Julesburg, and Wray, 15-20 inches. Distribution of Precipitation in Colorado
(Colorado Statae Planning Division, Denver) (July 1957). Cf. Arkansas mean annual
precipitation, 48 inches; Louisiana, 55; the New England States, 42; Wisconsin, 31.
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(1963).
An average of about ninety million acre-feet of water falls annually as precipitation in Colorado, but a large part is lost by evapotranspiration, and only about
sixteen milion acre-feet appears as runoff in the major streams. S. Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, Mineral and Water Resources in Colorado, REPORT OF THE
UNITED
MINING

STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY IN COLLABORATION
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD, 88TH CONG.,

WITH THE COLORADO
2D SEss. 233 (Comm.

Print 1964), hereafter cited as REPORT OF THE U.S.G.S.

5See, e.g., Lewis, Transmountain Water Diversions, 14 DICTA 185 (1937). For a
summary of Federal projects under construction, authorized, and those completed, and
water tunnels through the Colorado mountains, see COLORADO YEAR BOOK 19621964 at 519-29 (State Planning Div., Denver 1965). The prospect of any immediate
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transmountain diversions are already heavily committed; their
capacity to maintain the foreseeable growth in population and industry is limited. Inevitably then, a city would seek to recapture and
re-use at least some of the water from its transmountain diversion,
considering such use vital to its sustained and competitive growth.
The city would propose, after sewage treatment, to hold captive
the water (or recapture it) before abandonment into a natural
stream, convey it to city storage or pumping works, and use it for
non-potable purposes such as cooling of the municipal steam plant,
watering public parks and golf courses, street sprinkling, and flushing. It also could seek to sell or lease to nearby private users such as
golf clubs, estates, or colleges with extensive lawns and plantings,
and corporate water districts outside the city boundaries but within
the metropolitan area which would take either by direct line or by
exchange sale.6 The city would hope by this recapture and re-use
relief through federal desalinization programs is remote. But desalinization is indeed
an ongoing plan, as demonstrated by the following:
Advances Seen in Desalting Program.
Washington-Interior Secretary Stewart L. Udall said . . . he anticipates
within the next four years a big economic breakthrough in the accelerated
water desalting program now moving toward unprecedented intensity ....
The water program is now costing about twelve million dollars a year
out of a departmental budget of about $1.17 billion. AP report, Rocky
Mountain News, Jan. 1, 1965, p. 8, col. 1 (city ed.).
Late in the 1965 session, Congress approved a notable expansion and acceleration
of the Secretary of Interior's saline water-conversion development program, authorizing an additional $15 million for fiscal 1967 and authorizing as much as $185 million through 1972. 79 Stat. 509. (U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS, p. 2412 (Sept.
5, 1965)). And on Oct. 4, 1965, the White House announced an agreement with
Mexico to explore the possibilities of erecting a nuclear-powered desalting plant to
serve neighboring arid regions of both nations. AP report, The Denver Post, Oct. 4,
1965, p. 11, col. 1 (home ed.).
6The identification of the water would be by volume-intake measurement, to distinguish it within the corpus of sewage effluent from water appropriated from the
local watershed. That is, by measuring the inflow of transmountain water to its
system, the city maintains a continuous current record of that volume under its
control as contrasted to the remaining water which comes from local sources. The
amount recorded as present in the system from transmountain sources is that amount
which could be put to reuse.
Water measurement is made by numerous devices, among them the sharpedged orifice; the nozzle with pressure gauge; the venturi meter, which is widely used
to measure large flows in pipelines and lends itself to the installation of automatic
continuous recording devices; the weir, used often to measure the flow from wells and
in ditches and small streams; and proportional meters, which measure large flows
by metering a small known fraction thereof. Rates of flow by pump capacity and
plant output are often expressed in terms of gallons-per-minute and million gallonsper-day. The flow of streams, however, is measured in "second-feet," i.e., cubic feet
per second. Usual hydrological arithmetic equates an output of one cubic foot per
second for 24 hours with about 646,300 gallons per day. HIRSCH, MANUAL FOR
WATER PLANT OPERATORS at 238-50, 251-57 (1945). See also STEEL, WATER
SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE at 16-17, 601-03 (4th ed. 1960).
Fresh-water use (exclusive of hydroelectric power use) in Colorado in 1960
was about 9700 mgd (million gallons per day) or 10.8 million acre-feet per year.
Of this, 7100 mgd of surface water and 1800 mgd of ground water was used for
irrigation; 320 mgd of surface water (of which 200 mgd was for public-utility
fuel-electric power and 35 mgd of ground water was used for industry; 250 mgd
of surface water and 41 mgd of ground water for public supply. Hydroelectric power
use was about 3200 mgd. REPORT OF THE U.S.G.S. supra note 4, at 234.
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to recoup a portion at least of its outlay for the original purchase
or establishment of appropriation rights to the water, the construcion and maintenance of transmountain diversion works, the cost of
treating used water in sewage works, and the administrative costs
of serving as supplier to its system area.
The water to be re-used has heretofore been discharged into
natural streams, swelling their volume and redounding to the benefit
of downstream appropriators. These appropriators have shown no
sentiment for assuming any proportionate burden of the expense
of this imported water. Indeed, they can be expected vigorously to
challenge the city's right to dispose of the water by any means other
than simple discharge into the public watercourses.
The purpose of this note is to examine the city's right in Colorado to recapture its transmountain water, upon its own premises,
following purification from sewage, and re-use it for municipal
purposes or for sale to beneficial users in the metropolitan area.
The point of departure is the settled body of water law in Colorado, that: the water of natural streams is the property of the public,
is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, and is subject to
use by appropriation;' the right to divert water is based upon the
taking and putting to a beneficial use, and the use may be subject
to a constitutional order of preferences;8 a decreed water right is
valuable property, and its use may be changed and its point of
diversion relocated;9 a municipal corporation is not precluded from
art. 16, § 5:
Water of streams public property.-The water of every natural stream,
not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado is hereby declared
to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
And see generally the two articles by Burke, The Origin, Growth and Function of
The Law of Water Use, 10 Wyo. L.J. 95; Western Water Law, 10 Wyo. L.J. 180
(1956).
8 COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 6:
Diverting unappropriated water-priority preferred uses.-The right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right
as between those using the waters for the same purpose; but when the
waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all those
desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic purposes
shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purposes, and
those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have the preference
over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.
The appropriation law of the western states is sui generis. For an historical perspective of its development independent of, or by modification of, the old commonlaw Riparian Doctrine, see Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. R3"v. 252
(1936); 3 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, § 649 at 2017
(1904); HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WEST, U.S. Dept. of Agri., Misc. Pub. 418 (Washington, D.C. 1942) at 30-73.
9Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 579, 272
P.2d 629, 631 (1954). Cf. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. City
of Boulder, 402 P.2d 71, 74 (Colo. 1965).
7 CoLo. CONST.
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purchasing water rights previously used for agricultural purposes and
devoting them to municipal uses;1" a municipal corporation does not
have any different status from that of an individual or any other
party to a proceeding pertaining to rights for irrigation or for
rights to water for purposes other than irrigation;' the policy of
the law is to enforce an economical use of the waters of the natural
streams; 2 diversion of appropriated water from one stream across
the watershed to the basin of another is permissible under the appropriation doctrine; 3 a city may acquire by transmountain diversion
an amount of water to meet its future needs for a normal increase
of population within a reasonable time;14 the owners of a water right
may conduct the waters legally appropriated and stored into and
along any of the natural streams of the state and may take the same
out again at any point with due regard to prior and subsequent
rights of others to the other waters in such natural streams," but
whenever any person diverts water from one stream through another
stream, he takes it out again subject to deduction for seepage and
evaporation. 6
Unfortunately, a situation obtains which encumbers an attempt
to assess water law and apply it to modern municipal and industrial
problems. The judicial decisions and the statutes of water adminis10 Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, supra note 9.
11 City and County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo.
375 388, 276 P.2d 992, 999 (1954).
12 New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357, 366, 40 Pac. 989, 992 (1895).
13 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449-50 (1882). See also Lewis, Transmountain Water Diversions, 14 DICTA 185, 188 (1937).
14 City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 202, 96 P.2d 836, 842 (1939).
Regarding Denver as a supplier: The Denver Water Board presently provides nearly
200,000 acre-feet annually to some 700,000 persons, of whom 25% are suburbanites.
Consumption is expected to increase in ten years to 310,000 acre-feet for one million
persons, and to 430,000 acre-feet by 1985 for 1.4 million persons, 50% of whom will
be non-Denver residents. Denver has spent, between 1955 and 1965, $130 million for
water resources. Statement of R. S. Shannon, Jr., President, Denver Water Board. The
Denver Post, No. 25, 1965, P. 60, col. 3 (final ed.).
15 COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-5-2 (1963); Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Sill, 104
Colo. 215, 219, 89 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1939). And see Trelease, Reclamation Water
Rights, 32 ROCKY Mr. L. REV. 464, 471-72 (1960).
16 COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-6-1 (1963). All the principles just enumerated rest on the
past federal deference to the state's water law and customs. But for an assessment
of the alarm which has been raised in recent years that the federal government seeks
a reversal of the national policy, to the effect that ownership of water rights rests
in the federal government independent of state law, subject to its exclusive regulation and even termination of present appropriation rights, see National District
Attorney's Association, Western Water Law Symposium 1963 passim; Trelease,
supra note 15, at 481-85; Federal-State Water Rights, Hearings Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, on Problems Arising from
Relationships Between the States and the Federal Government with Respect to the
Development and Control of Water Resources, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., June 15-16,
1961.
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tration are grounded to a substantial degree in agricultural and
mining use. Thus the policy decisions that must be made upon the
demands of urban use are largely unrelated to those of an agrarian
economy."
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

INQUIRY

The re-use contemplated by the city is of its wasted or flowback transmountain water- i.e., of imported or "foreign" water. 9
There can be no re-use or sale by the city of sewage-treated water
from its local watershed, under the bar of Pulaski Irrigating Ditch
Co. v. City of Trinidad." There the City of Trinidad, diverting
water from the (local) Las Animas River, purified its sewage in
settling pits adjoining the river. A certain amount of the watercontent of the sewage seeped back into the river and became part
of the stream's supply to appropriators below. When Trinidad built
modern purification plants and proposed to sell the purified water
Some of our present difficulties in water administration stem from this
early emphasis on irrigation, because the early laws were not drafted to deal
with the large industrial and municipal water uses of today ....
Since that
time, this basic law has been patched, added to and tinkered with in attempts to make it more workable, but it has never been thoroughly revised
to meet modern conditions of water use. Danielson, Water Administration
In Colorado, Higher-ority or Priority?, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 293, 294-95
(1958).
In view of the comparatively recent rapid growth of the cities and towns
in Colorado, there have not been many decisions . . . involving municipal
water rights. We must therefore look to the irrigation decisions as the
source of much of our municipal water law on the subject of appropriation
[A] water right is created by diversion and use. This statement was
first formulated in relation to irrigation. The same rule applies in regard
to an appropriation by a municipality. Lindsey, Legal Problems in City
Water Supply, 22 ROCKY MT. L REv. 356, 363 (1950).
18 Compare Hutchins' definition of waste water with that of Kinney a generation
earlier:
Waste waters are principally those waters which, after having been diverted
from sources of supply for use, have escaped from conduits or structures in
course of distribution or from irrigated lands after application to the soil
....
[S]ome water is purposely released from control by the project management, because of the inability of consumers to make complete use of all
waters diverted. These waters are also referred to as waste, but in the
usual case they are returned to the stream from which diverted, or to some
other surface stream, by means of artificial channels controlled by the project, and therefore become available for use by downstream diverters.
HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 23-24.
Waste water may be defined to be such water as escapes from the works or
appliances of appropriators without being used; or such water as escapes
from an appropriator's land after he has made all the beneficial use thereof that is possible and which cannot be returned into the natural stream
from which it was originally taken. 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
17

RIGHTS § 661 at 1150-51 (2d ed. 1912).

19The term "foreign waters" is applied to waters taken from one watershed for use
in a different drainage basin. These waters are foreign, in that they are not naturally
a part of the water supply of the area in which used. HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note
8, at 375.
2070 Colo. 565, 203 Pac. 681 (1922). Accord, Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 Pac. 764, 773 (1925).
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to its co-defendant, the lower appropriators sought an injunction
against the sale. The injunction was denied, but the supreme court
reversed, holding that when sewage water is purified it is again
the thing which was diverted originally, that a title by such use is
not gained and when the use has been completed the right of user
terminates, that such water is not "developed" water after purification, and if there is a surplus remaining after use it must be
"returned to the stream whence it came."21 The court cited no cases.
The Pulaski case points up what is perhaps the strongest argument
against the right of the city to recapture its water. The Colorado
Constitution provides that "The water of every natural stream, not
heretofore appropriated . . . is hereby declared to be the property
of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of
the state, subject to appropriation ..
'2
An appropriator has,
then, only a usufructuary right, not a right of ownership. 3 If an
appropriator has only the right to use water until it has accomplished
the purpose for which it was appropriated, it can logically be argued
that it remains the property of the public during the entire time of
use, and must be returned to the public as soon as the purpose is
accomplished. A re-use would in effect be a second appropriation.
On the other hand, the Pulaski case involved water from the local
watershed, water that was subject to the adjudicated priorities of the
protesting downstream appropriators. The city today would seek
immediately to distinguish the fact that but for its transmountain
diversion the water would never appear in the stream and lower
users of the discharge could hold no rights or expectations in water
which was developed and imported by the city alone.24
The city's proposed re-use of its imported water may well be
21

Id., 70 Colo. at 568, 203 Pac. at 682.

§ 5, supra note 7.
E.g., Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, supra note 21, at 568, 203
Pac. at 682; Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 262, 206
Pac. 393, 395 (1922).
24 " 'Developed' water . . . is not water already in the stream and saved from loss, but
is new water added to the stream by the efforts of man . . . . Developed water is
water which would not have augmented the stream flow under natural conditions."
HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 362. But cf. Kinney's much narrower definition: " 'Developed water' is such subterranean or underground water as is discovered
and brought to the surface by the exploitation of man." 2 KINNEY, op. cit. supra note
18, § 1205 at 2186; State ex rel Mungas v. District Court, 102 Mont. 533, 538, 59
P.2d 71, 73 (1936) (water diverted from a running stream and conveyed elsewhere
cannot be called developed water). It is perhaps an arguable inference that the
Pulaski court contemplated the distinction between local water and foreign or
developed water as being the decisive factor in its holding, from its statement,
To turn this water back into the river will not increase the river's flow
above what it would have been had the water not been diverted, and it is
not therefore developed water. (Emphasis supplied).
70 Colo. at 569, 203 Pac. at 683.
2 CoLo. CONST. art. 16
23
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opposed on other principles, principles which, it must again be
noted, arose usually from decisions in agricultural disputes. The
owner of a priority has no right, if it works to the detriment of
junior appropriators, to increase the amount or extend the time of
his diversion in order to put the water to double use, by irrigation
of other lands in addition to those for which it was appropriated,
nor has he the right to lend, rent, or sell the excess water after
irrigation of the land for which it was appropriated if it works a
similar detriment."5 The appropriator may be held strictly limited to
the extent of former actual usage when he seeks to change the place
of use.2 When collected water in an irrigator's drainage canal is
discharged into a natural watercourse, it becomes a part of that
stream and is subject to public appropriation and use." Junior appropriators have a vested right in the continuance of conditions as they
25 Enlarged Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 586,
183 P.2d 552, 554 (1947), a case which also involved waters from the Las Animas
River; Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Rocky Ford Co., 79 Colo. 511, 515, 246 Pac. 781
(1926) (by implication). Cf. White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co.,
22 Colo. 191, 195-96, 43 Pac. 1028, 1030, 31 L.R.A. 828 (1896) (appropriator
more than doubled his diversion from a ditch, on the strength of his preceding contract with the ditch company's grantors; that enlargement was stopped, on the principle that any private contract regarding sale of water rights must bow to the state
system of regulation). See Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 356-57, 260 Pac.
401, 405 (1927) (mining operators diverted from an alien watershed, then attempted
to sell rights to downstream irrigator who was to take flume discharge and unused
volume).
26 Farmers Highline Canal and Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 584-85,
272 P.2d 629, 634 (1954). There the city purchased the right of a former irrigator
who had not put his entire decree to a beneficial use; the city sought to change the
point of diversion and to assert its right to enlarge the use for city needs to the extent
of the entire decree. The court rejected the attempt, holding, 129 Colo. at 584-85,
272 P.2d at 634, that regardless of the amount decreed, by changing the point of
diversion the city was restricted to former actual usage. The water involved was
local, in which the protestants held appropriation rights. Cf. Hall v. Blackman, 22
Idaho 556, 558-59, 126 Pac. 1047, 1048 (1912) (upstream appropriator perpetually
enjoined from carrying part of his appropriation beyond the land formerly irrigated,
because in so doing he deprived a junior of the use of seepage, waste, and percolating
waters which the latter formerly received from the use of the waters on land to
which they were decreed) ; Hutchinson v. Stricklin, 146 Ore. 285, 300, 28 P.2d 225,
230 (1933) '(an appropriator for power purposes, a non-consumptive use, had no
right to contract with irrigators to change the character of use to irrigation, a consuming use, to the effect of depriving the lower appropriator of water to which he was
entitled by appropriation) ; Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah
569, 579, 164 Pac. 856, 860 (1917) (landowner may not appropriate water for one
purpose and then apply it or any part of it to another purpose).
27 Quirico v. Hickory Jackson Ditch Co., 130 Colo. 481, 488, 276 P.2d 746, 750
(1954) ; Water Supply & Storage Co. v. Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co., 25 Colo. 87,
94, 53 Pac. 386, 388 (1898). Cf. Rock Creek Ditch and Flume Co. v. Miller, 93
Mont. 248, 260, 17 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (1933) (even fugitive waters originally
introduced from another watershed which have, by percolation, reached a natural
channel as waste water constitute part of that watercourse). Other jurisdictions
supporting this principle specify the intent to abandon or the loss of dominion by
discharging. Jones v. Warmsprings Irr. Dist., 162 Ore. 186, 91 P.2d 542 (1939)
(discharge without intent to reserve or recapture works an abandonment) ; Hagerman
Irr. Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649, 187 Pac. 555 (1920)
(the creator of an artificial flow of water is owner thereof so long as it is confined
to his property, but not after the creator has lost his dominion over it by deposit in
a natural stream).
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existed on the stream at the time they made their appropriations, 8
including the general method of use of water therefrom. 9 Yet, again
there must be pointed out what may be called a material distinction
in these cases. With hardly an exception, they show that the disputes
between appropriators concerned water from the local stream and
its watershed, and that the disputants were all actual holders of
appropriation rights in the source. It is this distinction which the
city would hold out in its contention for right to re-use, disclaiming
any concern for transmountain water wilfully abandoned but setting
up that since the rights in the water belong to the city alone, those
below are no proper complainants because when there are no rights
existing there can be no rights injured.
It would seem, then, that the protestants to recapture and re-use
stand more firmly upon the constitutional argument based upon
Section 5 of Article XVI, 0 viz., that water appropriated from a
natural stream in Colorado, whether or not from the watershed in
which it is used, cannot, under the same appropriation, be recaptured
or re-used or transferred to others for re-use after it has once been
put to beneficial use by the appropriator thereof. The thrust of the
argument is that transfer of the water by its appropriator (i.e., the
city) across a divide and into a watershed to which its presence
is foreign nevertheless confers upon all appropriators therein the
right and expectation of receiving the total discharge as part of the
local supply which is "the property of the public." This reasoning
entails the application of the Pulaski rule without reservation or
distinction based on the foreign origin of the water, and would in
effect allow users below the city a bonus of water imported entirely
through the efforts of the city. This argument was made before
the State Engineer of Colorado in 1965, by protestants to a contract
for exchange sale of water by the City of Colorado Springs to a
v. Manassa Land & Irr. Co., 379 P.2d 405, 407 (Colo. 1963) ; Enlarged
Southside Irr. Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 429, 210 P.2d
982, 985 (1949) ; Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 369, 28 P.2d 247, 251 (1933).

28DeHerrera

2Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irr. Ditch Co., 24 Colo. App. 496, 503, 135
Pac. 981, 984 (1913). California holds that whenever water in a natural stream
or watercourse is not reasonably required for beneficial use by owners of paramount
rights, whether the water is foreign or part of the natural flow, such owners cannot
prevent use of the waters by other persons, and it must be regarded as surplus water
subject to appropriation. True indeed, the appropriator may prevent waste of the
water by selling it to a willing purchaser, but he cannot compel anyone to purchase
his unneeded surplus water. Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner, 36 Cal.2d 264,
270-71, 223 P.2d 209, 213 (1950) (when the irrigator contracted to take all the
excess foreign water sent down the creek to him, and interdisposed irrigators took
therefrom what they estimated was excess, the court refused to order compensation
to be paid by the latter unless the one who contracted for the water was accepting
the excess with an actual need and intent to put it to use).
30 Supra note 7.
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private suburban water company."5 The argument was rejected by
the State Engineer.32
II.

SOME STATUTORY RAMIFICATIONS

The city also faces the negative implications, or commands, of
certain statutes. The first to be encountered contains a puzzling
closing sentence.
139-79-1. Leasing of water - no rights vested. - In the event any
municipal appropriator of water having a population in excess of
two hundred thousand people shall hereafter lease water not needed
by it for immediate use, no rights shall become vested to a continued leasing or to a continuance of the conditions concerning any
return waters arising therefrom, so as to defeat or impair the right
to terminate the leases, or change the place of use. Any leasing shall
31 The City of Colorado Springs contracted to sell to the South Suburban Water Company, a water company within its metropolitan area, amounts up to 600 acre-feet in
any calendar year. The water so sold was denominated as strictly from the city's
imported Blue River water, following sewage treatment, and was to be delivered,
by exchange methods, as solely "successive use water." The water company sought
by the agreement to supplement its appropriations on the local Cheyenne Creek.
Cheyenne Creek is tributary to Fountain Creek, which drains the Colorado Springs
area, and in which owners downstream from Colorado Springs held appropriation
rights senior to the water company. The exchange method agreed upon between the
city and water company provided that the water company would take water from
Cheyenne Creek, out of its order of priority, notify the city of the amount taken, and
the city would charge the water company's account for the Blue River water which
it had discharged into Fountain Creek. The effect was a substitution of imported
Blue River water into Fountain Creek to replace the amount taken by the water
company out of order of priority. The downstream appropriators, noting that Colorado Springs had always discharged its once-used Blue River water into Fountain
Creek adding to its natural volume, and that the city had no facilities for retaining
physical control of the water after sewage treatment, protested that the substituted
water was not new water available to the water company for that purpose but rather
was water that already belonged to the stream and was subject to existing stream
priorities. The protestants argued chiefly that water appropriated from a natural
stream in Colorado, whether imported or not, cannot under the same appropriation
be recaptured, re-used, or transferred to others for re-use after it has once been put
to beneficial use by the appropriator; that the very discharge of the treated water
into Fountain Creek indicated exhaustion of the beneficial use by the city, and so
the public water again is part of that dedicated to the people of Colorado under
article 16, § 5, Colorado Constitution; and that a second or partial use of water
cannot be transferred to a new user by sale, loan, or exchange, while the water right
is retained in the transferor, to the injury of those who need the water for beneficial
uses on the stream of discharge. Brief of Protestants, In the Matter of the Hearing
Before the State Engineer Regarding Storage of Water by the South Suburban Water
Company in Water District No. 10, Irrigation Division No. 2, Colorado State Engineer's Office, State Services Annex Bldg., Denver (April 21, 1965).
32 The State Engineer of Colorado expressly distinguished foreign from local water and
gave as his ruling that when an importer of water increases the amount of water in
the stream of beneficial use he is entitled to use the new water to the best of his
ability, and that other appropriators on the stream to which the water has been
imported, having exerted no effort in said importation, are not entitled to participate
in any benefits arising therefrom. The ruling expressly referred to the fact that in
the original federal decree which allowed use of Blue River water to Colorado
Springs, Decree of the United States District Court, District of Colorado, United
States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Civil Nos. 2782 (incorporating
Nos. 5016, 5017), Oct. 12, 1955, the city was under a duty to measure regularly the
quantities of return flow from its municipal uses of the transmountain water and to
report regularly to the Secretary of the Interior of the United States what steps, by
legal action or otherwise, the city has taken to utilize such return flow by exchange
or otherwise so as to reduce or minimize the demands of the city upon Blue River
water. Ruling of the State Engineer, In the Matter of the Hearing Before the State
Engineer, supra note 31, at 2-4.
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not injuriously affect rights theretofore vested in other appropriators. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize an appropriator to recapture
water for a second use after it has once been
3
used by it.
The statute protects Denver, in its lease of water to outside
consumers, from the latter acquiring vested rights in such leases. It
came under examination by the supreme court in City and County of
Denver v. Sheriff34 in 1939 and City of Englewood v. City of Denver 3" in 1951, and though the court found no issue involving that
final sentence and made no interpretation of it, an examination of
the cases is germane to the subject here.
In City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, the city appealed from
a general (transmountain) water adjudication decree which (a) subjected the city's new western slope water to a restrictive condition
that Denver's use of the imported water was to be merely supplemental and contingent upon prior use of its earlier (eastern slope) appropriations, and (b) denied the city any appropriation whatever
based upon general irrigation purposes. The trial court (a western
slope jurisdiction) was quite candid in stating that its decree was
intended to guard "against the City of Denver going into the business
of selling water or disposing of a part or all of her present [eastern
slope] water rights and substituting the [imported] water acquired
...

in this proceeding for her present water supply." 6 The supreme

court modified the decree, striking down the restrictive condition,
(a) supra, on the principle that the eastern slope appropriations,
being a property right in absolute unconditional decrees, could not
be so restricted, nor so dealt with by a court alien to eastern slope
jurisdiction, and that the supreme court had previously stated in
Denver v. Brown, 65 Colo. 216, 138 Pac. 44 (1914), that the city
could lease its eastern slope water to irrigators under certain conditions." The court, in examining Section 139-79-1 (then known as
Chapter 163, Section 398, Colorado Statutes Annotated 1935), held
that under the section there is a difference between use of water for
municipal purposes and use of water for irrigating and that cities
having a population of 200,000 or more may by prudent management appropriate an adequate supply for a reasonable time in the
future."8 It made no reference, however, to the final sentence of the
33 COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-79-1 (1963) (emphasis supplied).
34 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
35 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951).
36 City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, supra note 34, 105 Colo. at 201, 96 P.2d at
840, 841.
37 Id. at 201, 96 P.2d at 840.
38 Id. at 202, 96 P.2d at 841-42.
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section." There was no issue requiring it, for the dispute concerned
a decree, not recapture or re-use. The court did sustain the trial court
in its denial of the city's appropriation based on beneficial use for
irrigation purposes outside of the Denver Municipal Water System
area; the court made clear that the city was not prohibited from
leasing water not needed for immediate use, under the decision of
Denver v. Brown, supra, but it just as clearly held that the need of
water to satisfy beneficial use necessarily must apply to the system
40
area.
The supreme court was similarly silent in its later consideration
of Section 139-79-1 in City of Englewood v. City of Denver.4 Englewood, whose residents had been purchasing water from Denver, (a)
petitioned against Denver's increasing the rates to Englewood, on
the ground that Denver was operating as a public utility and so was
fully subject to the jurisdiction of the state public utilities commission, and (b) sought a finding that Denver was contractually bound
to furnish water to Englewood consumers at the rates prevailing in
Denver itself. The trial court entered declaratory judgment of dismissal. The supreme court affirmed, holding that Denver's prime
purpose was to supply water to its residents, an act of a "municipal
utility" rather than a "public utility"; that the act of supplying water
to users beyond the territorial limits of the city [Denver] did not
impress the business with a public interest because the outside users
had no right to demand the service;' that so operating on a utility
basis, Denver could collect charges and make such conditions as it
wished, all without liability of any vested right for a continued sale
or lease of water, and that Denver "holds such water as is not needed
by it for immediate use in its proprietary capacity, in which it has a
well defined property right .... ."' There was no intimation as to
the final sentence of Section 139-79-1.
The sentence patently means the seller or lessor of water-i.e.,
the city as appropriator-and not the purchaser or lessee. The wording "Nothing ...shall authorize an appropriator to recapture water
for a second use after it has once been used by it" contains no positive prohibition to recapture, but rather a negative implication,
"Nothing . . .shall authorize .... " Possibly the legislators meant
39

The section was worded at the time, "Provided, further, that nothing herein contained
shall authorize an appropriator to recapture water for a second use after it has once
been used by it." COLO. STAT. ANN. ch. 163, § 398 (1935).
40 105 Colo. at 210, 96 P.2d at 844.
41 123 Colo. 290, 229 P.2d 667 (1951).
42
id., 123 Colo. at 298, 229 P.2d at 671-72.
43
Id., 123 Colo. at 300-01, 229 P.2d at 673.
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in drafting the statute in 193144 that the city, in leasing or selling
to outsiders, could not retake that volume from the stream into which
the outside purchaser or lessee would discharge it after use. In any
event, that final sentence of Section 139-79-1, with its serious negative implications, must eventually be interpreted by the courts as
cities proceed with, or expand, their methods of re-use of appropriations.
There is another statute which, if germane, must be satisfied by
the city.
148-2-6 ....
Water claimed and appropriated for domestic purposes
shall not be employed or used for irrigation or for application to
land or plants in any manner to any extent whatever. The provisions
of this section shall not prohibit any city or town or corporation
organized solely for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of such city or town from supplying water thereto for sprin45
kling streets and extinguishing fires or for household purposes.
The apparent strictness of this injunction has been vitiated by the
supreme court, e.g., in City and County of Denver v. Sheriff46 wherein it said:
The term "municipal uses" never has been used in connection
with water adjudication proceedings before, to our knowledge. This
term necessarily includes agricultural purposes within the city area.
. . . We said [in Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 Pac. 44

(1914)] "Irrigation means the application of water for the purpose of nourishing plants. We think the application of water to
grow trees upon streets and to irrigate trees, shrubs, grasses, and
other plant life usually grown in parks constitutes the use of water
for irrigation just as much as the application of water to grow
crops upon farms ....
"
Counsel for defendants in error say in their brief . . . "There
is no desire on the part of the defendants in error . . . to deny the

City of Denver its right to use the appropriated water for all municipal purposes, including the irrigation of its parks, lawns, and
shrubbery.' 47
Upon this the city presumably could contend that it may also, inter
alia, water golf courses ("parks").48
44

Colo. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 172, p. 811, § 1.

4 Coto. REV. STAT. § 148-2-6 (1963).
46 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).

47Id.,
48

105 Colo. at 209-10, 96 P.2d at 844.
Indeed, the city might consider it reasonable also to argue its right to sell its nonpotable, sewage-treated water for use in areas within its system even though outside
its corporate limits. The court did specify in Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. at 210,
96 P.2d at 844, "The need of water to satisfy beneficial use . . . necessarily must
apply to the system area." So, it could be contended, if a city's water system runs
outside its actual municipal limits, water may be leased or sold throughout the
system both inside and outside the city limits. See Van Tassel Real Estate & Livestock Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 49 Wyo. 333, 365-66, 54 P.2d 906, 916, cert. denied,
299 U.S. 574 (1936) (the municipality having prior appropriation of waters for
municipal use is entitled to dispose of surplus water to places-in this case a military reservation- closely adjacent to the city which, so far as "municipal use" of
water is concerned, may be considered as parts of the city).
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III. THE CITY AS AN APPROPRIATOR
The city is not prevented from arguing from the perspective
of common sense and justice. Recalling that it owns the rights in
the transmountain water, has imported it at substantially its own
direct expense, will or can hold it on its premises, means to apply
it or grant its application to a beneficial use, and is acting in good
faith to prevent wastage and unnecessary expense, the city finds
certain strong grounds upon which to base its argument. Note, however, that none is as close to the specific point of re-use of sewage
water as is the Pulaski case. 9
When an appropriator has actually diverted water from a stream
under his priority, the water he has taken is (as against would-be
appropriators thereof) no longer a right but a possession, not an
interest in real estate as it had been, but personal property."
Water once lawfully in an appropriator's possession may, in
the absence of an intent to abandon, be prevented from escaping,
or may be recaptured while escaping, and such waters are not the
subject of appropriation,5' and this even though there has been ac49 70 Colo. 565, 203 Pac. 681 (1922), supra note 20 and accompanying text.
50

1

Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard City, 131 Colo. 177, 183, 280 P.2d
426, 428-29 (1955)
(by implication) Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood,
124 Colo. 366, 373, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (1951); Madison v. McNeal, 171 Wash.
669, 674, 19 P.2d 97, 98 (1933); Riggs Oil Co. v. Gray, 46 Wyo. 504, 512-13, 30
P.2d 145, 147 (1934); 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, § 661 at 1153,
§ 773 at 1340 (2d ed. 1912); 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES,
§ 35 at 33 '(3rd ed. 1911). See Knapp v. Water Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 52-53, 279 P.2d
420 (1955).

' McKelvey v. North Sterling Irr. Dist., 66 Colo. 11, 14-15, 179 Pac. 872, 874 (1919)
Colthorp v. Mountain Home Irr. Dist., 66 Idaho 172, 182, 157 P.2d 1005, 1007
1945) (though upwards of 75% of the water decreed to the upper ranch had
wasted, following irrigation, into the creek and had been made use of for 40 years
by the complaining lower ranch, the upper could not be required to continue the
waste of water, nor prevented from recapturing it on its land for a beneficial use) ;
Cleaver v. Judd, 393 P.2d 193, 195 (Ore. 1964) (an irrigation district as a municipal corporate entity is regarded as an owner for the purpose of the principle that
an owner may recapture waste and seepage water before it leaves his land) ; Barker
v. Sonner, 135 Ore. 75, 79, 294 Pac. 1053, 1054 (1931) (waste water is not waste
water so long as it remains upon the land of the original appropriator) ; McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 404, 242 P.2d 570, 574 (1952) (as long as original
appropriator has possession and control, he may recapture and use the waters for
further beneficial uses) ; Lasson v. Sealey, 120 Utah 679, 687-89, 238 P.2d 418, 42122 (1951) (even built a check-dam, under statutory limitations). And see Trelease,
Reclamation Water Rights, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 464, 470-72 (1960); Breitenstein,
Some Elements of Colorado Water Law, 22 RoCKY MT. L. REV. 343, 350-51 (1950).
Care must be taken, however, to distinguish such as the MKelvey case, supra, in
which water broke through its ditch and ran down a dry draw, from the well known
Colorado rule that water which percolates underground from a reservoir or ditch,
and would naturally reach the stream if not interfered with, is considered a part of
the stream, not subject to retaking under the appropriation which first captured it.
E.g., Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261, 206 Pac. 393,
395 (1922); Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 443-44, 191 Pac. 129, 130-31 (1920) ; Trowell Land & Irr.
Co. v. Bijou Irr. Dist., 65 Colo. 202, 214, 176 Pac. 292, 296 (1918); Comstock v.
Ramsay, 55 Colo. 244, 255-56, 133 Pac. 1107, 1111 (1913).
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quiescence in another's use of the waste water.5" There is expansive
language that an appropriator, after his right as a ditch supplier has
ripened, if there has been no abandonment since the decree of appropriation, may apply the water to other land than that upon which
the first application was made, or sell it to others who may apply
it to other lands; the water decreed for irrigation is not confined to
the land upon which such a right ripened, and may be applied to
new or additional lands without putting the appropriation to a
double use or duty.53
Among the cases-predominantly agricultural as they are, but
upon which reliance must be made for judicial guidelines-those involving foreign waste waters are noticeably rare. There are, though,
at least three Colorado cases concentrating on such waters: San Luis
Valley Irr. Dist. v. Prairie Ditch Co. and Rio Grande Drainage
Dist.," Coryell v. Robinson,5 and Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood." In San Luis Valley one defendant, Rio Grande Drainage
District, constructed a drainage canal which discharged its waste
water across a watershed into the Rio Grande River; the other defendant, Prairie Ditch Company, which had not participated in the
construction of the drainage canal, tapped the canal sometime later
and then procured a decree of No. 1 priority to forty second-feet
therefrom, upon the district court's finding that but for the drainage
canal the water would never have entered the Rio Grande River-i.e.,
the canal was discharging foreign water into the river. An attack by
the San Luis Valley Irrigation District against the Prairie Ditch
appropriation was rejected. The supreme court affirmed, holding
that since the water was not a part of the river and never could constitute a source of supply thereto, the claimants in the river could
not complain that a new taker (Prairie Ditch) had injured them with
its diversion.57 The implication is clear that such outside waters are
52Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 190, 86 Pac. 98, 99 (1906) (surface overflow
from irrigated lands onto claimant's land was suddenly, and validly, cut off by the
appropriator, who caught the water in a ditch on his side of the property line);
Fairplay Hydraulic Mining Co. v. Weston, 29 Colo. 125, 128, 67 Pac. 160, 161
(1901) (mining company which permitted irrigator to enter and divert placer waste
from the company's flume was under no obligation to maintain either a flow clean
enough for irrigation or the flow itself).
53 New-Brantner Extension Ditch Co. v. Kramer, 66 Colo. 429, 436-37, 182 Pac. 17, 20
(1919). The language of this case seems deceptively and contrarily broad. It was
uttered with reference to a mutual ditch with numerous owners who at times used only
part of their irrigation water-or none at all. The court decided, then, that such unused
water may flow down to others on the ditch, permitting the irrigation of a larger
number of acres than that upon which the right ripened, without putting the water
to a double duty. The court has not examined the holding since.
54 84 Colo. 99, 268 Pac. 533 (1928).
55 118 Colo. 225, 194 P.2d 342 (1948).
56 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
57 84 Colo. at 106, 268 Pac. at 535.
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introduced independently of the local watershed and its appropriators and are subject to recapture and, if abandoned, appropriation
by the first taker (in this case, Prairie Ditch).
But in Coryell v. Robinson twenty years later (1948) the court
apparently flew in the face of the implied authority of San Luis
Valley by deciding that the first taker was qualified to do so only
if he had contributed the new water by his own efforts. Again, the
diversion was transwatershed, although remaining in the same general basin (Gunnison River). An irrigator, Coryell, had purchased
with the tract the right to take five-eighths of the waste water from
the remaining lands of his grantor, who apparently was one McKinnon. Coryell constructed three ditches on McKinnon Draw, which
was so situated that water would move there by seepage or surface
flow before moving down to other courses and on into the river.
Later, water was imported into the watershed by others via the Cedar
Mesa Ditch, which ran near McKinnon Draw and gave off waste
and seepage. The waste and seepage were caught by Coryell's ditches
and so prevented from running down to the lower appropriators.
In a subsequent general water adjudication of the district, Coryell
was awarded only .75 second-feet to his ditches, a right apparently
far below the waste he was catching, and junior in time to those
below him. He never appealed the decree, and continued to take
the waste. Finally the seniors below complained, the water commissioner ruptured the ditches several times, and Coryell attempted to
enjoin them all and quiet his title. His action was defeated, and although the supreme court affirmed, relying heavily on both the
San Luis Valley case and a 1914 case, Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter,58 it announced a rule contrary in effect to San Luis Valley, viz.
that any prior and independent right to foreign water lay only in
the person who had by his own labor and efforts contributed it to
the normal flow of the watershed and hence, in absence of such effort on his part, Coryell the junior must defer to his seniors below
under the regular order of appropriative right:
In both of the cases [referring to San Luis Valley and Ironstone
Ditch], the successful litigants had, by their own efforts, lawfully
contributed water to the stream or stream basin which otherwise
would not have reached it . . . . In the instant case, plaintiff
[Coryell] has not by his own labor or efforts contributed extraneous
water to the normal flow of the watershed ....

The water would

appear to belong to the watershed, to be distributed with other
waters in the watershed according to the decreed-priorities. 9
58 57

Colo. 31, 140 Pac. 177 (1914).

59 Coryell v. Robinson, 118 Colo. at 233-34, 194 P.2d at 346. (Emphasis the court's.)
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Yet in San Luis Valley, the "successful litigant," Prairie Ditch Company, had not worked to import the waste water. It had merely
tapped on and later secured a No. 1 priority to forty second-feet
therefrom. On its face, then, Coryell may seem to stand as potentially
a persuasive support of the city which today asserts a preference in
recapturing and re-using its imported water, for it fits the description
"own efforts ... contributed ... extraneous water." But it has been
severely criticized as poorly reasoned and as misstating the facts and
misapplying the holding of San Luis Valley, and as causing a "tangled web of uncertainty" as to whether a transwatershed appropriator
really can recapture his water.6
As to the other case, Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter,6 ' which
the court coupled with San Luis Valley to turn away Mr. Coryell:
the water involved was apparently local, but trapped and immobile in
marshes not far from the stream. Certain appropriators, Numbers 2
and 3 (as their priorities and ditches were designated by the courts)
became frustrated by the ungovernable pirating of their water by juniors upstream (the juniors even ambushed some of the headgate
patrolmen and threw them into the river) and by vast and irremediable seepage into sand bars long before the remaining water reached
their headgates. So Numbers 2 and 3 went across, and down, the
river and ditched the seepage and waste water from the marshes upstream for a mile, dumped it into the river just above their headgates,
found it adequate for their needs, and then sold their 2 and 3 priorities to a canal miles upstream from everybody. The change of point
of diversion of these priorities was approved in the court below. The
supreme court affirmed, rejecting the protestants' theory that some
seepage from the canal would get down to 2 and 3 and thus set up
a double use of the priorities. More important, the court held that
the feeder ditch of Numbers 2 and 3-the one from the marsheswas carrying water by an independent right, separate from their
original decree and developed since its adjudication. The court first
reiterated the basic rule that an appropriation right depends in no
way upon the place of its application and that the point of diversion,
the conduit, the place of application, and character of use may each
and all be changed.2
Then came the statement to which the Coryell court later turned.
Attention is called particularly to note 63 infra, following the quota60 Martz, Seepage Rights in Foreign Waters, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 407, 409 (1950).
81 57 Colo. 31, 140 Pac. 177 (1914).
62 Id., 57 Colo. at 39, 40, 140 Pac. at 180.
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tion, explaining the stigma of "dictum" which lay upon that statement until the Coryell court coupled it with San Luis Valley as
authority. The statement in Ironstone Ditch Co.:
It must not be forgotten that No. 3 consumers constructed at
their own labor and expense the Feeder ditch by which the seepage
water . . . doing no one any good, was conveyed a mile up the
river .... This was an independent appropriation from extraneous
sources . . . . If, by their efforts, they lawfully contributed water
to the stream, which otherwise would not have reached it . . . it

was theirs, independent of the original adjudication decree, and
because, by their labor, they contributed extraneous water to the
normal flow is no reason why they may not sell
their priorities, and
63
irrigate their land with the independent water.

The recapturing city would point to this paragraph as designating
its foreign appropriation not subject to past decrees of the local
appropriators who claim rights to receive the full discharge. It points
to the strong language regarding efforts to contribute extraneous
water as implying exclusivity of control by him who labors for and
secures that water.
Thus, from Ironstone Ditch Co. and Coryell (even with the
infirmities of both) the city could logically contend today that he
who by his labors and expense procures water not otherwise avail63 Id., 57 Colo. at 42-43, 140 Pac. at 181. Here let it be pointed out that the Coryell
court, choosing Ironstone Ditch Co. as an authority for giving preference to a developer of extraneous water and holding such water to be an independent supply,
implicitly abandoned a decision in 1920 which had labelled as dictum part of the
Ironstone Ditch Co. opinion, and which, although not specifying the part, seemed
to mean that part just quoted in the text, supra. The 1920 case was Rio Grande
Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 191
Pac. 120 (1920), which reiterated the rule that seepage which escapes from a reservoir and percolates toward the stream is now again part thereof and cannot be reappropriated by the reservoir which held it. In the case, the reservoir company, contending that it could recapture its seepage, relied on Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter, apparently contending that recapturing its seepage was merely capturing waste
extraneous water. That this was probably the reservoir company's theory is indicated
in the dissent by Garrigues, J. Justice Garrigues (who wrote the Ironstone Ditch Co.
opinion) said, 68 Colo. at 445, 191 Pac. at 132, that he thought that the disputed
water was extraneous to the natural or regular flow of the stream, and later cited
the syllabus of Ironstone Ditch Co. as stating that "seepage water which is being
wasted is the subject of appropriation." At any rate, the opinion of Rio Grande
Reservoir said, 68 Colo. at 444, 191 Pac. 131, that
That part of the opinion in Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter . . . quoted
by the plaintiff in error . . . is purely gratuitous and volunteer matter, and
not responsive to any issue in that case ....
The proceedings there brought
were to change the point of diversion of certain appropriations, and the
only question for decision was whether the proposed change would injuriously affect vested rights to the use of water from that stream. The dictum
. . . relied upon . . . can be considered only as the individual opinion of a
single justice of this court, and of course, while persuasive, can in no sense
be held to be the opinion of this court ....
But now, a generation later, Coryell calls upon that portion of Ironstone Ditch Co.
as authority, and ignores the Rio Grande Reservoir opinion. Clarification must come,
to determine whether the Coryell court was, indeed, intent on making new law. It is
this last possibility which has cast a pall of uncertainty about Coryell.
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able for use in the watershed has a right to its use independent of
others."
These irrigation cases are cited and discussed because of the
working rules which have emerged. These rules, if applicable also
to a municipal entity, may well be weapons of attack for the city,
and seemingly the best available, for they extend preference and
more than a shadow of license to the one responsible for artifically
developed water. The importing city seeks to fit itself into the law's
formula: "artificially developed" water is that produced which
would not otherwise naturally have reached the stream."
In Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood66 the city moved
to change its point of diversion and the character of use from irrigation to domestic and municipal purposes, thus to effect a radical
decrease in the city's purchase of water from Denver. Downstream
appropriators protested that this would reduce their amount of
waste water because Denver would import less water from the western slope. The supreme court rejected that protest, holding that appropriators on a stream have no vested right to a continuance of importation of foreign water which another has brought into the watershed.67 The same applies to local water: there is no obligation upon
an owner to continue to maintain conditions so as to supply water
to appropriators of waste water at any time or in any quantity, when
Cf. Leadville Mine Dev. Co. v. Anderson, 91 Colo. 536, 17 P.2d 303 (1932)
(Where a person by his own efforts has increased the flow of water in a natural
stream, he is entitled to the use of the water to the extent of the increase, but he
must prove that it was produced and contributed by him and that it would not
otherwise have reached the stream) Comrie v. Sweet, 75 Colo. 199, 225 Pac. 214
(1924); Bieser v. Stoddard, 73 Colo. 554, 216 Pac. 707 (1923). See also Platte
Valley Irr. Co. v. Buckers Irr., Milling & Improvement Co., 25 Colo. 77, 82, 53
Pac. 334, 336 (1898) (dictum) ; Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641,
642-43 (1909).
Could the city even argue that it could sell all its other rights and use the
developed water for its own needs? This raises the apprehension, it may be recalled,
that was uttered by the trial court in Denver v. Sheriff, supra note 36, that Denver
was "going into the business of selling water or disposing of a part or all of her
present water rights and substituting the water acquired" for her present water
supply. 105 Colo. at 201, 96 P.2d at 840-41. The apprehension seems much slighter
now, negated by the city's effort to re-use what it has at present.
6
5 Dalpez v. Nix, 96 Colo. 540, 544, 45 P.2d 176, 178 (1935) ; Comrie v. Sweet, supra
note 64. Cf. West Side Ditch Co. v. Bennett, 106 Mont. 422, 433, 78 P.2d 78, 81
(1938) (the theory of a development of a new water supply contemplates the increase of a stream occasioned through the exertion of man directed to that end, and
does not contemplate accessions to the stream through the process of nature, as by
percolating waters); Spaulding v. Stone, 46 Mont. 483, 488, 129 Pac. 327, 329
(1912) (exclusive use for any purpose of a new supply of water developed or
collected from lands forming no part of the source of the flow).
66 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
64

67

124 Colo. at 377, 237 P.2d at 122. The court cited in support the broadly-worded
California case, Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal.2d 343, 90 P.2d 58 (1939),
which is discussed below (note 72 and accompanying text).
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acting in good faith. 8 Or if a senior appropriator by a different
method of irrigation can so utilize his water that it is all consumed
in transportation and consumptive use and no waste water returns,
no appropriator can complain." A claimant to waste waters acquires
a temporary right only to whatever water escapes which cannot find
its way back to the source of supply. No permanent right can be acquired to have discharge of waste water continued-not by appropriation or prescription or estoppel or acquiescence.7" No action therefore will lie for the diversion (i.e., cessation) of an artificial watercourse where from the nature of the case it is obvious that the enjoyment of it depends upon temporary circumstances and is not of a
permanent character. 7' This logically leads, the importing city would
contend, to the conclusion that he who has no right cannot be injured by him who does have the right. A loss of a luxury-viz., a
windfall or bonus-type of increased flow-which has been forthcoming merely from convenience, arose from exactly that: convenience.
E.g., Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard City, 131 Colo. 177, 181, 280
P.2d 426, 428 (1955); Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Schneider, 50 Colo. 606, 610,
115 Pac. 705, 706 (1911) (and conversely, the ditch owner cannot maliciously divert the water away to vacant lands); Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 190, 86
Pac. 98, 99 (1906); Mabee v. Platte Land Co., 17 Colo. App. 476, 479, 68 Pac.
1058, 1059 (1902) ; Fairplay Hydraulic Mining Co. v. Weston, 29 Colo. 125, 128,
67 Pac. 160, 161 (1901); Twin Falls Co. v. Damman, 277 Fed. 331 (S.D. Idaho
1920); Wedgworth v. Wedgworth, 20 Ariz. 518, 523, 181 Pac. 952, 954 (1919);
Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 34, 276 Pac. 1017, 1029 (1929);
Application of Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 162, 248 P.2d 540, 546 (1952); Meine v.
Ferris, 126 Mont. 210, 217, 247 P.2d 195, 198 (1952) (by implication) ; Hagerman
Irr. Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649, 656, 187 Pac. 555, 558
(1920) ; Tyler v. Obiaque, 95 Ore. 57, 61, 186 Pac. 579, 581 (1920); Garns v.
Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 272, 125 Pac. 867, 872 (1912) ; Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo.
451, 469, 102 P.2d 54, 59-60 (1940).
69
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 101, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (1957).
702 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, § 661 at 1151 (2d ed. 1912); Ryan
v. Gallio, 52 Nev. 330, 345, 286 Pac. 963, 967 (1930).
True, artificial flow claimants may, by taking the abandoned waste water, have
priority among themselves, but they can have no right of continuance against the
owner of the natural supply, except by grant, condemnation or dedication. 1 WIEL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, § 56 at 50 (3d ed. 1911). That the sale of
water by a city to outside users is no "dedication" to a public use without the intention thereof by the seller, see City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver,
123 Colo. 290, 299, 229 P.2d 667, 672 (1951), and cases cited.
71 1 WIEL, op. cit. supra note 70, § 57 at 55.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-2-2 (1963) provides:
Priority of right to spring water.-All ditches constructed for the purpose of utilizing the waste, seepage or spring waters of the state, shall be
governed by the same law relating to priority of right as those ditches constructed for the purpose of utilizing the water of running streams; provided
that the person upon whose lands the seepage or spring waters first arise,
shall have the prior right to such waters if capable of being used upon
his lands.
This prior right to "waste, seepage, or spring waters," redounds to the benefit of
the importing city under the restrictive interpretation applied to the statute in 1929
when, in substantially the same wording and known as Colo. Laws 1921, § 1637,
it was held to apply only to non-tributary waters, i.e., waters that do not "belong
to the stream." Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 181, 279 Pac. 44, 45-46 (1929).
68
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And the city which now chooses to exercise its right unto itself is acting within the only right in sight, its own.
The type of broad holding supporting the right which the Colorado city now contemplates, to recapture and re-use its foreign supply was made by the Supreme Court of California in an irrigation
case, Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation District.72 The land of the complaining waste-taker was located on a creek below the boundary of
the defendant District. From about 1912 the District imported foreign water, the waste and percolation of which considerably increased the creek's volume. The complainant took it from the creek
and used it without interruption for about twenty-two years. Then
the District began to recapture the waste by diverting it frcm the
creek within its (the District's) boundaries. At the trial the complainant prevailed. The Supreme Court of California reversed. The
court set forth the issue in this way:
Stating the question another way, where the producer of an
artificial flow does not decrease it at the source, but after importing

it, acts upon it a second time while it is still within his land and
before it leaves his control, . . . may lower appropriators assert a
right to enjoin any decrease in the volume of abandoned water ?

The court answered in the negative. It explained first that transwatershed diversions reduced to possession are private property during
the period of possession, and that when the actual water, or corpus,
has been relinquished or discharged without intent to recapture, the
property in it ceases; but such abandonment is not abandonment of
a water right, but merely abandonment of the specific portions of
water, i.e., the very particles which are discharged or have escaped
from control; and the past abandonment by the importer of certain
water, as distinguished from a water right, does not confer any right
to the complainant to compel a like abandonment in the future or to
control the District's use upon its own land of such water as it imports-and this, despite the fact that the complainant built diversion
works in reliance upon the continued volume. In the process of
growth, the court said, the District, which cannot perfect its system
"in a day," discharges a large volume of arificial flow over a long
period of formative years, but that should not constitute an abandonment of the right to such waters.7"
In elaborating the breadth of its opinion, the court cited with
13 CaM.2d 343, 90 P.2d 58 (1939).
7I3., 13 Cal.2d at 350, 90 P.2d at 61.
71 Id., 13 Cal.2d at 351, 90 P.2d at 61-62.
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5 an irrigation case in which recapapproval United States v. Haga,7
ture of seepage and percolation beyond the boundaries of origin was
permitted where it was contemplated in advance, and then concluded:

[A]s a general proposition, an irrigation district, after importing water from one river, passing it through irrigation works, and
discharging it into a natural creek bed in the second watershed,
may change the flow of water imported or the volume of water
discharged from its works into the second stream, or stop the flow
entirely, so long as this is done above the point where the water
leaves the works of the district or the boundaries of its land. An
exception to the rule is not created by the fact that the district may
act upon the water a second time while in its possession, by retaking
6
it at a point of drainage for further beneficial application.

By analogous application of such reasoning as appears in
Stevens, and with existing mechanical statutory power," the city
would seem to present a plausible argument for right to recapture
from its sewage works for subsequent recirculation for municipal
uses, including irrigation of parks and golf courses and out-of-boun-

daries supply (whether by exchange measurement or directly) to suburban water companies, manufacturers, military installations, private
One who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts appropriable water
from a stream, and thus makes it available for fruitful purposes, is entitled
to its exclusive control so long as he is able and willing to apply it to
beneficial uses .... It is requisite, of course, that he be able to identify it;
but subject to that limitation, he may conduct it through natural channels
and may even commingle it or suffer it to commingle with other waters.
United States v. Haga, 276 Fed. 41, 43-44 (S.D. Idaho 1921).
There may well be small comfort, however, to the Colorado appropriator in this
holding, for aside from the contingency that the recapture is contemplated in advance, Colorado authority has long since held that seepage and percolation cannot
be recaptured outside their source once they begin the movement toward a natural
tributary. E.g., Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261,
206 Pac. 393, 395 (1922) ; Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap
Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 443-44, 191 Pac. 129, 130-31 (1920).
76 Stevens v. Oakdale Irr. Dist., 13 Cal.2d 343, 352, 90 P.2d 58, 62-63 '(1939). The
Stevens rule was applied in a municipal case, Los Angeles v. Glendale, 23 Cal.2d
68, 77-78, 142 P.2d 289, 295 (1943), in which the City of Los Angeles was held
to retain its right to the use of its foreign water even though some was sold, en
route, to irrigators and, as foreseen at the time of sale, percolated after use by the
latter into the city's underground reservoir and abided there ready for city use. Speculation in California now turns to whether or not recapture may be made of ground
(seepage) water which was origially foreign water imported and put to use by the
Bureau of Reclamation Project which now contemplates recapture. Comment,
Recapture of Reclamation Project Ground Water, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 541 (1965).
77
COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-32-1 (1963).
Powers of governing bodies.-The governing bodies in cities and towns
shall have the following powers: ...
(38)
To construct public wells, cisterns and reservoirs in the streets and
other public and private places within the city or town, or beyond the limits
thereof, for the purpose of supplying the same with water; to provide
proper pumps and conducting pipers or ditches; to regulate the distribution
of water for irrigating and other purposes, and to levy an equitable and
just tax upon all consumers of water for the purpose of defraying the expense of such improvements . . ..
(39)
To supply water from their water systems to consumers outside of the
corporate limits of the cities and towns; and to collect therefor such charges
and upon such conditions and limitations as said towns and cities may impose by ordinance.
75
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clubs, etc., which are now or will be linked to the metropolitan water
system.78
The city is not without its burden in this. It may indeed show
itself as one recapturing or holding captive its foreign water within
its works or boundaries, and so not within reach of the established
Colorado rule that diverted or stored water which is allowed to seep
off and move toward a stream becomes a part of it, free from the
appropriation which first took it. 9 Yet there stands such a principle
as holds in California, that one may not compel another to purchase,
or pay for taking, the former's unneeded surplus water.8" The city
may show that Colorado holds that a city, in operating a waterworks
system, acts in its proprietory or business capacity and when a surplus of the material (water) distributed is acquired it may be sold
to consumers without the city,8' but the city may face disallowance
from deliberately producing a surplus merely for profitable outside
dealing. Court decrees of water rights can be, and are, aimed at
preventing an appropriator's right from developing-wilfully or
not-into a real abuse of a public resource in short supply.82
78 As to the possibilities of discharging the treated water into the natural streams,
just as heretofore, but now with a contract to furnish to the users below (and with
express intent not to abandon), that is potentially a source of complaint by those
downstream who have enjoyed the increase to the stream gratis for years. Those
who would contract to purchase from the city and take delivery by means of a natural
stream must, inevitably, include junior appropriators or even those with no appropriation at all. Indeed, would they not be the first customers in line? They would be
anxious to purchase, and would expect the seniors to stand still and permit the measured "contract water" to pass by. And the seniors-they could never rest well in
any aloof assumption that the city could not store or itself re-use all that treated
sewage water and would have to discharge it. Such an assumption would be unrealistic, for the city would (a) in its performance of its constitutional duty restrain
its own intake of foreign water to its current needs and beneficial use, regardless
of the excess available to it by appropriation right, and (b) with the passage of
years and continued growth of both quantity and variety of demand, apply more
and more of the treated water to its own uses in its own system, eventually reaching capacity-i.e., its volume of consumptive water use would equal the potential
supply, thus consuming totally the treated foreign water which formerly was discharged.
78
E.g., Fort Morgan Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. McCune, 71 Colo. 256, 261, 206 Pac.
393, 395 (1922); Rio Grande Reservoir & Ditch Co. v. Wagon Wheel Gap Improvement Co., 68 Colo. 437, 443-44, 191 Pac. 129, 130-31 (1920) ; Comstock v. Ramsay,
55 Colo. 244, 255-56, 133 Pac. 1107, 1111 (1913).
80
Stevinson Water Dist. v. Roduner, 36 Cal.2d 264, 270-71, 223 P.2d 209, 213 (1950),
supra note 29.
81 Larimer County v. City of Fort Collins, 68 Colo. 364, 367, 189 Pac. 929, 930 (1920),
in which the court considered and upheld as not ultra vires, the city's contract to
reimburse construction costs of extension of its water line beyond the corporate limits.
And see 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, §§ 37, 38 at 36-38
(3d ed. 1911).
82 E.g., The final (consent) decree of the United States District Court, District of
Colorado, in United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., Civil
Nos. 2782 (incorporating Nos. 5016, 5017), Oct. 12, 1955, applying to numerous
rights and containing careful stipulations as to duty of use and ability to draw pro
tanto upon both transmountain and other sources; Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193,
210, 96 P.2d 836, 844 (1939), in which the state supreme court agreed that from
the facts in that particular case, there was no basis upon which the trial court could
have awarded the city an appropriation based on beneficial use for irrigation purposes outside of the Denver Municipal Water System area.

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL. XLII

CONCLUSION

It seems possible and reasonable that a resolution of the questions here presented may emerge from a certain fundament of all
the cases, of all law- duty. There is a duty unmistakable in all
the circumstances considered. It is duty to preserve and not to destroy,
to use and not to abuse. It is, in a more familiar term, a duty not to
waste.
There may be no waste of water.83 The law requires economical
8
use. " The duty not to commit "waste" is imposed upon all users,
i.e., not to use "needlessly or without valuable result; [nor] to employ prodigally or without any considerable return or effect, [nor] to
use without serving a purpose.- 85 Appropriators owe a duty so to
use water as to effect the highest duty reasonably possible.86 The
appropriator must exercise that reasonable degree of care to prevent
waste, and use without excessive waste should be made even though
expense is incurred in constructing facilities therefor." In the arid
states the conservation of water is of the utmost importance to the
public welfare; to waste water is to injure that public welfare.88 So
it would seem that an appropriator should be "commended for recapturing water that has already been used by himself and applying
it again in a beneficial manner.""
The essence of the city's contention would be that in holding
what is properly taken, carefully extracting maximum benefit of use,
and prudently protecting what is already built, and is planned for
the future - what is that but the very definition of duty to preserve
and use a resource which is not constant in amount o and in all events
83

Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 17 Colo. 146, 153-54, 28 Pac. 966, 968 (1892).

8E.g., Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 430, 94 Pac.
339, 341, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 238 (1908); New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21
Colo. 357, 366, 40 Pac. 989, 992 (1895).
85 Meridian, Ltd. v. City and County of San Francisco, 13 Cal.2d 424, 447, 90 P.2d 537,
548 (1939), quoting Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934).
8
6Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 22, 276 Pac. 1017, 1024 (1929);
Tudor v. Jaca, 178 Ore. 126, 141, 164 P.2d 680, 686, reh. denied, 178 Ore. 176, 165
P.2d 770 (1946).
87
Broughton v. Stricklin, 146 Ore. 259, 275, 28 P.2d 219, 224 (1933), reh. denied,
146 Ore. 259, 30 P.2d 332 (1934).
88 Brian v. Fremont Irr. Co., 112 Utah 220, 224-25, 186 P.2d 588, 590 (1947).
89

Barker v. Sonner, 135 Ore. 75, 79, 294 Pac. 1053, 1054 (1931).
90 The maximum flow of the rivers of Colorado has varied significantly and repeatedly.
E.g., the Colorado River, largest of all (and which yields about 69% of the state's
total supply), has been so erratic as to range from 146% of average in the highwater year of 1907 to only 50% of average in the drought year of 1934. As measured
at Glenwood Springs, before the river collects the major part of its tributary inflow,
the average discharge for the 31-year period 1900-30 (2.31 million acre-feet) was
some 37% higher than for the succeeding 33-year period 1931-63 (1.82 million acrefeet). On the eastern slope, the Arkansas River, measured at Canon City, has declined
in average a full one million acre-feet in the priod 1925-63 (4.5 million acre-feet)
from the preceding period 1889-1924 (5.5 million acre-feet). REPORT OF THE
U.S.G.S. supra note 4, at 235-37, 247.
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declines proportionately to the growth of population and industry.
The idea of re-use is itself far from revolutionary.
The reclamation of sewage and waste waters is not as unconventional as it first appears. .

.

. In 1953 reclaimed waters were used

for irrigation at 106 places and for recharge of ground water at
112 places, all in California. There were also 118 places in the
United States where such waters were used for industrial purposes. . ... 1

It seems also that the city which seeks to recapture and re-use
its treated water is suggesting no radical invasion of legal and economic principles of either the state or the Republic. Consider: the
proposal involves originally developed or purchased, perfected water
rights of precise amount and strict supervision; there is nothing that
smacks of invasion by expropriation or seizure. The act and method
of re-use seem, at the best, to find support by the reasoning of statutory and case law under article 16 §§ 5, 6 of the Colorado Constitution, and, at the worst, to be open to serious question only in the
extent and location of the re-use beyond the general metropolitan
area and its water system. And of further importance, there appears
to be no just standing of those below the city to protest the diminution of a discharge of foreign water.2 Standing lies, in the law,
with those who assert rights not in the waste but in the source of the
water - those across the mountains who take from the same source
as the city. Where these latter are protected in thir rights, an actionable protest does not arise from the circumstances herein contemplated.
William K. Hickey
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HIRSHLIEFER, DEHAVEN & MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY
AND POLICY 324 n. 87 (1960). See also MCCARTHY, Research and Development for
Re-Use of Water, WESTERN RESOURCES CONFERENCE 1963 at 55 (Univ. of Colo.
Press, Boulder 1964). Industrial re-use of water which had previously been used
for municipal purposes has long been practiced in the United States. See Cannon,

Industrial Re-Use of Water: An Opportunity for The West. WESTERN RESOURCES
CONFERENCE 1963 at 69.
92 See Martz, Seepage Rights in Foreign Waters, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 407, 416-17
(1950).

